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Chapter 14
Pension Systems Compared: A Polarised 
Perspective, a Diverse Reality
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Abstract Globalisation and international competition have a spillover effect on the 
reforms of pension systems that imposes a similar pattern of dismantling, hardening 
access to pensions, reducing expenditure and retrenchment in said reforms. The 
comparative analysis of four countries with different pension systems: two liberal 
(United Kingdom and Chile) and another two with contributory-proportional sys-
tems (Spain and Argentina) serves to determine the details of the reform processes, 
which discursively seem to have a shared pattern recommended by the international 
financial and economic institutions.
But the reality of the four case studies shows considerable differences in the 
implementation of the pension reform policies. The reforms depend on the societal 
context, institutions, history, the role of unions, the government in power, demo-
graphic factors and economic perspectives, among other matters. Many countries 
need to sustain pension systems because they are associated with many pensioners’ 
political vote. Therefore, the spillover effect of globalisation and the convergence in 
certain uniform patterns of reforms is far from reality in the four countries, and as 
such, the measures adopted are specific for each country.
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The aim of this chapter is to analyse the changes (1) in the public contributively pen-
sion systems protected by the State (pay-as-you-go) and (2) the private capitalisation 
pensions, managed by insurance companies or banks. The latter are divided into two: 
(a) on the one hand, occupational capitalisation pensions, which involve financing from 
a company and voluntary contributions from the employees; (b) on the other hand, 
private capitalisation pensions taken out individually by a person with a bank or an 
insurance company (Del Pino and Rubio Lara 2016). Today, resuming the debate about 
pensions, from a comparative inequality studies perspective, entails describing their 
oscillating nature in some countries in Latin America, as well as the redesigning that 
has taken place in European countries since the Great Recession (2008–2015).
For the case of some countries from the southern cone—Argentina, Uruguay and 
Brazil, with the exception of Chile—said movement can be contextualised via com-
plex processes of social change, which took place during the last decades of the 
twentieth century and the first decades of the present century. While, on the one 
hand, the re-democratisation processes in the region operated in societies with an 
optimism based on recovering the protective role of the State, in parallel, the public 
policies implemented did not manage to overcome the economic downturns, giving 
rise in the 1990s to the beginning of a cycle of adjusting fiscal expenditure in the 
conditioning context of external debts. Both processes happened during the global 
reorganisation of austerity capitalism that reconfigured the economy, and in particu-
lar the labour markets.
Said political and economic reconfigurations became a focal point of discussion 
because they blocked the stability of traditional social protection and therefore the 
welfare of the populations, in this case that of elderly adults, placing the democratic 
design at a point of tension between the State and the market. It is no coincidence 
that every once in a while, citizens’ claims against adjustment or against neoliberal 
policies are repeated. Today we are witnessing mass citizens’ demands in Chile1 and 
Colombia, as well as on the other side of the Atlantic in France, and not too long 
ago, in Spain and the United Kingdom. In all of these, people have been protesting 
about pensions in very different contexts. The discourse calling for the negotiation 
of new social pacts after the changes of a globalised economy, once again polarises 
societies about how to provide social welfare in democratic designs.
In Latin America, social welfare systems have traditionally been divided into 
contributory and non-contributory systems.2 While the contributory Social Security 
is generated from payments by the insured and by employers with state guarantees 
based on the diverse conditions and positions in the labour market, on the contrary, 
1 Beyond the range of claims in the Chilean citizens’ movement that began in October 2019, the 
NoMásAFP movement is notable in reference to the pension capitalisation system managed by the 
pension fund managing companies.
2 While some literature in Latin America uses the term “pillars”, a word taken from the first report 
from the World Bank and the OCDE, its use is less frequent.
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the non-contributory Social Security is rendered viable through public policies 
aimed at those who do not meet all the terms and is executed through a financing of 
revenues and general taxes or with surpluses from the contributory systems. Non- 
contributory pensions in Latin America were limited when these systems initially 
came into effect; however, they experienced considerable growth in recent years in 
order to ease the living conditions of the most vulnerable population. Their growing 
evolution has played a very important role in the debate, by accompanying the 
trends in the reforms of the state welfare systems towards individual capitalisation 
systems, in which the employer’s contribution disappears and the State’s role 
becomes subsidiary.
As stated by Bertranou (2006 and Bertranou et  al. 2009), the reforms of the 
1990s adjusted financial and economic goals to move towards capitalisation while 
in the first decade of the present century the poverty-relief goals were readjusted, 
and as such the coverage was extended to those sectors lacking contributory condi-
tions. Based on these considerations, the reflection made by Mesa-Lago (2004: 99) 
is relevant. He highlights the enormous diversity of pension systems in countries of 
Latin America, summarised in three different models: substitutive, parallel and 
mixed. However, beyond the perspective of this double division of welfare systems 
into contributory and non-contributory ones, state (public) and capitalisation (pri-
vate or mixed), there are permanent reforms to the parameters which reconfigure the 
ages to access the benefit, the increase in the years of contribution, redefinitions of 
the formulae to calculate the amount to be received; aspects that contribute towards 
the increase in gender or age inequality.
Beyond the pioneering example of Chile which reformed its state welfare system 
to a capitalisation regime in 1980, the reforms that followed this model proved to be 
loss-making either because they did not comply with the objectives set out, or 
because they could not be sustained in adverse economic contexts. As a result of the 
critical contexts in both continents since 2008, new reforms were subsequently con-
sidered. In Latin America they were known as re-reforms; such as in Argentina and 
Chile, among other countries (Becker and Mesa-Lago 2013).
Furthermore, a specialised literature review highlights the existence of a series of 
points in common in the reforms implemented in the European Union (European 
Commission 2012), through the Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC). The suc-
cessive reforms of the welfare state have demonstrated a trend towards the reduction 
of expenditure on pensions, strongly conditioned by debt and public deficit in coun-
tries such as Spain, Italy, Greece, Portugal and Ireland, as we will see below. This 
context favours the emergence of two theories on the reformist trends in pensions. 
On the one hand, the idea of the Active Welfare State, a liberal-social proposal that 
defends the maintenance of the welfare state, introducing the principle of activa-
tion. Both the OCDE and the European Union have supported and promoted its 
objectives, mentioned again through the European 2020 Strategy by the European 
Commission (Rubio Lara 2016). On the other hand, the conservative proposal of the 
Investor-State considers that the sustainability of the welfare state depends on the 
medium-term growth rates, and in turn, this depends on investment in R&D (research 
and development), human capital and the spread of new technologies (Palier 2010). 
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Therefore, the principle guiding this policy is the “return on investment”. However, 
both theories often have points in common, as we will see below.
We face similar problems in the countries from both continents, but to different 
extents. These are precarious labour markets, the transcontinental migratory explo-
sion, ageing of the population, public debt and the financial downturn. While in the 
European Union the balance between the active and inactive population in forecasts 
for 2050 is concerning, the same can be said for some Latin American countries. 
Flexible and precarious labour markets, with low salaries and high vulnerability of 
social rights, fuelled by a migratory work force from other countries in the region, 
have turned the debate about pensions into a tight knot that jeopardises the tradi-
tional views of social protection.
Considering these conditions, the forecast of the expenditure on pensions for the 
countries from both continents is concerning, and even more so when in each situa-
tion in which the fiscal deficit intensifies, the advice to introduce structural reforms 
or changes in restrictive parameters is repeated, as well as the insistence to turn 
towards capitalisation systems. In this way, the definitions of who retires and in 
what conditions (age, pension sum) and with what financing—whether state or cap-
italisation—gives rise to a debate that is under no circumstances resolved.
With a view to performing a comparative treatment to give an account of the 
effects of the reforms implemented and their consequent trends, we have selected 
case studies of two European countries (Spain and the United Kingdom) and two 
Latin American countries (Chile and Argentina). The choice of the two former 
countries serves to show the trends towards private occupational pensions—although 
with very different degrees of implementation—while, in the latter two, we situate 
the trends of re-reforms in two different cases: a capitalisation system and a 
state system.
Our analysis is based on the comparison of different welfare models and their 
reform policies. In the countries studied the dominant discourse is about the need to 
reform pensions to facilitate sustainability in the context of globalisation (spillover 
effect). One of the options lies in the implementation of negotiated occupational 
welfare (Trampusch 2007), but its implementation depends on the political context, 
its institutions of collective negotiation and the role of unions and employers. In 
other words, reference to the context reminds us of the importance of “societal fac-
tors”, history, local institutions and the role of social actors, such as unions, employ-
ers and the government, among others (Boyer 2005). Thus, the hypothesis we 
formulate is that the reform policies of pensions do not follow a standard pattern 
imposed by the demands of globalisation, but the responses differ according to the 
institutional context.
In the context of these considerations, this chapter is structured in five sections 
after this introduction. In the first section, we will review the social protection sys-
tem in the context of the global economy and the subsequent theoretical discussion 
of two paradigms: Neoliberalism and the Active Welfare State. In the second sec-
tion, we will conduct a brief statistical analysis to identify the general models into 
which pension systems fall in Argentina, Chile, Spain and the United Kingdom, 
providing us with a comparative framework with other countries. In the third 
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section the possible elements of convergence of the reforms brought on by globali-
sation in pension policies (spillover effect) are discussed, as well as the general 
responses. In the fourth section we will analyse the cases of the four countries in 
depth, which will show us how there have been different responses to similar prob-
lems, although there have also been common elements in the responses. Lastly, in 
the fifth section, we will draw some conclusions.
14.2  Social Protection in the Context of Global Economies
Vast literature has been written about the transformation of the welfare state, which 
Adelantado and Calderón (2005, 2006) summarise in three explanations: (1) the 
transformations are due to external globalisation pressures (spillover effect) that 
have forced governments to reduce social expenditure, fiscal pressure, to make the 
labour market more flexible, to decentralise collective negotiation to business level, 
among other factors due to international competition; (2) another argument is that 
the transformations of the welfare state are due to internal factors resulting from 
pressure from social actors, such as employers and unions, to the ageing of the 
population and the subsequent increase in expenditure on pensions and health, and 
the move towards a services economy with jobs with lower average salaries that in 
industry and, consequently, fewer revenues from Social Security payments; (3) the 
third explanation consists of the combination of both factors in which exogenous 
and endogenous factors influence each other, giving rise to multiple responses, 
depending on the local institutional context. In this context of reforms in recent 
decades, new concepts have appeared, such as the Active Welfare State and the 
Investor State (Vielle et al. 2005; Palier 2010).
14.2.1  The Neoliberalism Crisis: A Change of Paradigm 
in Europe?
Although the theory of the Investor State has a conservative connotation and the 
Active Welfare State is of a social-liberal nature (Boyer 2005), we could agree that 
they today form part of a new paradigm that appears in the literature of advanced 
European economies from 1995. The term Active Welfare State seems more appro-
priate to use because it goes beyond the economic perspective, it is more sociologi-
cal and includes an institutional dimension, social and labour rights, and social 
actors (unions, employers, third sector, etc.). Moreover, it is essentially a new and 
different paradigm that is alternative to neoliberalism (Arnsperger 2005). Therefore, 
we are facing a potential crisis of the neoliberal paradigm which has dominated the 
political scene from 1980 to the present day in the European context.
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In the last decade a crisis of the liberal paradigm and its political formulae to deal 
with unemployment, pensions and social protection seems to have begun. Indicators 
of this are, among other phenomena, the rise in protectionism, nationalism and 
regionalism, Brexit, the mass demonstrations in Chile and France and protests of 
pensioners in Spain in response to the uncertainty and rise in inequalities (Campos 
Lima and Martín Artiles 2014, 2018). Therefore, it should come as no surprise that 
the Active Welfare State is a response to the neoliberalism crisis as a new emerging 
paradigm (see Table 14.1).
As regards intervention of the State, neoliberal approaches have defended the 
idea of the Minimum State. On the contrary, the Active Welfare State paradigm 
argues the need to sustain the state’s role in the economy and welfare, but linked to 
the return on investment in initial and continuous training, as well as support for 
production (Vielle et al. 2005).
As regards the prediction of retirement pensions, the neoliberals have proposed 
the expansion of individual private pension plans. On the contrary, the Active 
Welfare State proposes a strategy of a Multi-pillar Welfare State with different 
Table 14.1 Comparison neoliberalism & social active state
Neoliberalism 




Minimum State Public investment oriented to return, support to 
production and social redistribution
2. Welfare State Dismantlement
Workfare not Welfare
Financial sustainability of Welfare
Agenging societies and pressions of voters on 
labour parties and trade unions
3. Retirement 
Pensions
Private pensions plans Multipillar Welfare State, diversifications 
sources of financialization
  – Contributively and proportional pensions
  – Assistance pensions
  – Occupational pensions
  – Private pensions plans






Flexibilization of labour 
market
Individual merit and social cohesion
Future return of investment policies
Activation, employability; continuous training
5. Collective 
Bargaining Level
Limited at company level
Decentralisation 
collective bargaining
Social Pacts: articulation between levels, Trend 
to desentralisation collective bargaining
Occupational Pensions: Negotiated Welfare 
corporatist
6. Assistance Guarantee Minim 
Income
Workfare
Assistance policy against poverty but linked 
with conditionality of incomes: training, 
searching for activation, employability
7. Social Policy Assistance, first social 
policy it is employment
Articulation between active employment 
policies and social policy: conditionality of 
social protection
Source: Own elaboration
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sources of finance to guarantee its sustainability (Comisión Europea 2003), such as 
contributory-proportional public pensions, welfare pensions to relieve the poverty 
risk, negotiated occupational pensions in companies, individual pension plans with 
tax allowances and the intervention of the third sector in the area due to the decen-
tralisation of the welfare policies (European Commission 2012).
As regards the implementation strategy, liberal thinking has been characterised 
by Margaret Thatcher’s famous thought in the 1980s, that we could summarise as: 
more market less State, more entrepreneurship less unions (see Harrison 2011: 
331–332) This strategy is complemented by the idea that social merit is an essential 
condition for upward social mobility. The Active Welfare State also proposes indi-
vidual merit, but associated with the return on investment in training, activation, 
employability and continuous life training, without neglecting the need for social 
cohesion. Social dialogue between unions, employers and the State is important. 
Therefore, collective negotiation and social pact are important elements to construct 
negotiated occupational welfare (Trampusch 2007).
Lastly, regarding welfarism, the newest feature of the neoliberal proposal against 
extreme poverty could be related to the guaranteed minimum income, but with the 
hidden intention of paying the Welfare State. On the contrary, the paradigm of the 
Active Welfare State proposes a welfare policy linked to the conditionality of the 
benefit, which consists of more continuous training and active job-seeking (European 
Commission 2012). The proposal is to link the active job-seeking policies with the 
passive benefit policies; in other words, to link pre-distributive and post-distributive 
policies (Zalakain and Barragué 2017).
In short, we can deduce that the link between passive and active policies is a 
challenge to sustain the welfare state. Therefore, it is understood that from the 
Active Welfare State theory we are facing a double challenge to implement the pre- 
distributive policy in the collective negotiation to guarantee income from salaries 
and their respective contributions via social contributions, while also implementing 
a post-distributive policy that sustains the pension system. Let us remember that 
some analysts understand that this policy should be accompanied by changes in 
financing (Clasen and Clegg 2012) through the diversification of the sources of 
funding through a multi-pillar system3; this political strategy—promoted by the 
European Union—seeks to diversify the funding so as not to depend on contributory 
pensions, the demographic effects of the ageing of the population, and the changes 
in the labour market. These changes explain the move from Welfare to Workfare 
stemming from the concept of the Active Welfare State (Boyer 2005). In other 
3 In accordance with Liedo (2005), the social security systems described as “multi-pillar” have 
been adopted from the taxonomy proposed by the WB and the OCDE based on three pillars cor-
responding to: “Pillar 1: a redistributive and anti-poverty system financed with taxes, relatively 
small, with defined benefit and publicly managed; Pillar 2: a defined contribution system of com-
pulsory capitalisation and privately managed through a personal or occupational plan; Pillar 3: a 
voluntary defined contribution system, of capitalisation and privately managed. The World Bank 
doctrine proposes the separation of the redistribution functions from the saving functions in social 
security systems”.
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words, a reduction in the redistributive intervention of the State with protective 
criteria to correct the former post-distributive inequalities to another pre-distributive 
policy, associated with activating unemployed people towards employability, active 
job-seeking and the extension of the retirement age because life expectancy is 
increasing. In other words, as described in the second chapter of this book, there is 
a tendency to emphasise the importance of pre-distributive policies to the detriment 
of post-distributive policies (Zalakain and Barragué 2017).
Nevertheless, some analysts express their doubts about the supposed new para-
digm of the Active Welfare State and the Investor State. The paradigm of social 
investment has been presented as a new model of the welfare state that differs both 
from the Keynesian welfare state and the neoliberal model, with a wide consensus 
in antagonistic political positions such as social democracy and conservative driv-
ing forces. However, under said paradigm, such different models of social invest-
ment are considered that Rubio Lara (2016) expressed his doubts as to whether this 
really establishes a break with the neoliberal trend.
14.2.2  Re-reforms in Latin America
A considerable difference is the weak institutionalisation of the pension and social 
protection systems (Ubasart and Minteguiaga 2017) in Latin America. Likewise, the 
neoliberal paradigm has dominated the political discourse. The impacts of the neo-
liberal economic reconfigurations in the Latin American countries brought about 
reforms in the social security systems in the region, backed by international finance 
organisations. The World Bank (1994) instigated the reforms of the pension systems 
in various countries in the region; with its famous report Envejecimiento sin Crisis 
(1994) [Ageing without Crisis], it laid down the foundations of the structural 
reforms towards a multi-pillar system that recommended both the strengthening of 
the capitalisation and non-contributory pillars; the main goal was to encourage the 
replacement of the public “defined benefit” based on “distribution”, with individual 
capitalisation systems of “defined contribution”. These reforms reduced the state 
function and introduced new economic agents such as private pension funds, essen-
tial actors in a capital market (Tangarife et al. 2015).4
In 2004, Mesa-Lago produced an analysis for CEPAL with the aim of compre-
hensively comparing the impact of pension reforms in the context of the traditional 
principles of the Social Security. With a view to observing the divergence of stances 
with the principles established by the International Labour Organization and the 
International Association of Social Security, the author presents an analysis of how 
the principles protected by the treaties promoted by these organisations adapted to 
4 A decade later, the World Bank would publish another document: “Keeping the Promise of Old 
Age Income Security in Latin America” (2004), described by some analysts “as a self-criticism” 
of its first report.
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the economic criteria of the reforms driven by the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund.
Welfare pensions have also been part of social policy in Latin America, and dem-
onstration of poverty is demanded. The paradigmatic example is observed in the 
reform of the Chilean social security system that took place in 2008 and once again 
placed the tension between focalisation and universalisation at the centre of the 
debate. The political discourse surrounding welfarism has also been linked to the 
demands for activation, employability and conditionality of the benefits, although in 
actual fact this policy is still underdeveloped as a result of the high costs of manag-
ing unemployment, as shown in Chap. 13 of this book.
In the academic debate in Latin America, it has been insistently proposed that the 
social security system reforms replaced the distribution regime with the capitalisa-
tion regime, in such a way that the political intervention of the state now has a 
subsidiary role. In this regard, it is important to remember that maintained by Del 
Valle (2010) regarding how the commercialisation levels operating in society are 
defined. The author’s comment must be related to the necessary intervention of the 
state and to the informality of the labour markets in the region. In short, the Latin 
American social model can be defined as Structural Heterogeneity resulting from 
the combination of formal economy, informal economy, double currency (dol-
lar + local currency), family economy and weak institutionalisation of social protec-
tion (see Chap. 2).5
14.3  Classification of Pension Regimes
This classification analysis seeks to discuss each of the four countries studied in the 
context of welfare models. The construction model of this classification of pension 
regimes was created using five variables (Table 14.2).
 – The first variable is the GDP per capita. This variable conditions the possibilities 
of social expenditure, expenditure on pensions, in particular, but it also  conditions 
5 Del Valle (2010: 66–67). Del Valle (2010) criticises the argument “we could put forward the 
theory that, in all societies with a market economy, the forms of state intervention in social rela-
tions stem from the systemic relation that exists between the State and the economy”. Following 
that put forward by Offe & Ronger, he specifies that “distribution refers to the intervention via 
which the State assigns resources which it already monitors or obtains through coercive exercise 
(laws, decrees, etc.) in order to guarantee processes of accumulation of capital. (…) the existence 
of underground activities can be interpreted as the result of the forms of state intervention, it can 
be stated that these cannot be interpreted as reflections of current transformations in the supposed 
path towards modernisation but as a structural part of the functioning of Latin American systems. 
(…) and a political dimension, given by the way the State intervenes in the stratification processes, 
and this is due to its role in the assigning of resources, in other words, as an agent that takes 
resources from some people and gives them to others. In this regard, the State defines the com-
mercialisation levels operating in society, since the practice of assigning resources reproduces, 
amplifies and reduces stratification processes”.
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the growth of occupational pensions and private pension plans. The term occupa-
tional pensions is used to refer to those private capitalisation pensions that com-
panies offer to their employees through collective or individual agreements. 
Private capitalisation pensions are those individually taken out through policies 
with banks or insurance companies.
 – The second variable is occupational and private pension plans (measured as a 
percentage of the capital accumulated above the GDP), which enables us to see 
a clear division between the capitalisation regimes and the other contributory and 
universalist regimes.













Argentina 47.1 21,064 14.3 7.8 10.2
Austria 10.0 53,895 26.6 13.9 5.5
Belgium 13.5 49,526 28.9 11.8 7.3
Brazil 46.8 15,651 15.1 9.1 12.6
Bulgaria 15.9 20,948 16.0 0.0 12.5
Chile 22.2 24,181 16.1 5.1 70.2
Czech 
Republic
9.2 38,037 18.7 9.0 8.9
Denmark 11.2 54,337 28.0 10.3 45.4
Finland 6.3 46,344 28.7 12.9 47.7
France 9.8 44,125 31.2 14.9 0.7
Germany 10.2 52,574 25.1 10.0 6.7
Greece 32.8 28,580 23.5 16.2 0.7
Hungary 12.2 28,799 19.4 11.5 3.9
Ireland 13.5 76,889 14.4 7.4 31.6
Italy 19.0 40,981 27.9 15.7 7.6
Mexico 57.0 19,655 7.5 1.8 14.1
Netherlands 9.4 54,423 16.7 6.9 171.0
Norway 7.3 62,182 25.0 9.9 9.8
Poland 38.0 29,583 21.1 11.3 7.5
Portugal 12.1 32,554 22.6 13.8 9.7
Romania 28.9 26,590 14.9 0.0 5.2
Slovakia 16.7 32,376 17.0 8.1 11.7
Slovenia 5.0 36,163 21.2 11.8 5.6
Spain 27.3 39,087 23.7 11.4 8.8
Sweden 8.2 51,405 26.1 8.9 4.1
United 
Kingdom
13.3 44,909 20.6 7.7 104.5
Uruguay 44.3 11,739 16.0 0.0 27.1
USA 36.0 59,774 18.7 4.9 76.3
Sources: ILO (2019) and OECD (2019)
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 – The third variable is the expenditure on pensions, measured as a percentage of 
the GDP, which also contributes to clarifying the division between the different 
pension regimes.
 – The fourth variable provides us with information on social expenditure, which 
can contribute to the definition of regimes based on the greater or lesser presence 
of the State in social protection and in subsidies and transfers.
 – Lastly, the fifth variable is the volume of informal employment, which will also 
help us to classify the pension models because said variable indicates that the 
countries with a greater proportion of informal employment (such as those of 
Latin America), have fewer resources for contributory pensions and, therefore, 
the most likely option is the development of non-contributory pensions and wel-
farism to tackle poverty. These indicators have been collected for a set of 28 
European and American countries.
According to this model, we perform a factorial analysis of chief elements to 
describe the correlations between the variables considered and to observe the distri-
bution of similarities between the different countries. The correlations observed 
show us how social expenditure has a positive association with the expenditure on 
public pensions and with the GDP per capita, and a negative correlation with infor-
mal employment, which highlights that informal employment is a serious obstacle 
for the post-distributive policy. Public pensions correlate similarly; they have a posi-
tive correlation with the GDP per capita, which also highlights the importance of the 
level of wealth to be able to distribute and avail of pensions in a country. The rela-
tion between public pensions and informal employment is also negative. The GDP 
per capita has a negative relation with informal employment, as could be expected.
Our analysis reveals an explained variance of 79% with the first two factors. 
Table 14.3 shows the relation between the original variables and the two retained 
factors, and Fig.  14.1 represents the distribution of the countries in the factorial 
space. The first dimension (52%) is defined by the social expenditure in comparison 
to informality. Thus, countries with high social expenditure, such as the Scandinavian 
social democratic countries contrast with the Latin American countries or the coun-
tries with low social expenditure and a high level of informal employment. The 
second dimension (27%) reflects high or low levels of private pension plans, 
Table 14.3 Component matrix
Components
1 2
Informal employment −0.817 −0.262
GDP per capita 0.721 0.487
Pensions public expenses (% GDP) 0.779 −0.407
Private pensions plans (% GDP) −0.040 0.901
Social expenses (% GDP) 0.893 −0.238
Correlations
Source: Cited dates (ILO 2019) and OECD (2019)
14 Pension Systems Compared: A Polarised Perspective, a Diverse Reality
430
grouping those countries with private capitalisation regimes at the top, and at the 
other extreme, at the bottom, those countries with contributory regimes.
Based on the intersection of these two dimensions, Fig. 14.1 shows the distribu-
tion of the countries classified into three groups after applying a hierarchical cluster 
analysis using the Ward method. (1) On the one hand, in the upper right quadrant, 
the countries with predominantly capitalisation regimes based on occupational and 
private pension plans appear. In other words, countries considered to have liberal 
regimes, such as the US (76.3% GDP), the United Kingdom (104.5% GDP) and 
Ireland (31.6% GDP). In this quadrant, a particular case is the Netherlands (171% 
GDP) as it has a very important occupational pension regime of companies and 
private individuals, but strictly speaking it cannot be considered a liberal regime 
because its plans are part of a negotiation tradition (since the beginning of the twen-
tieth century) of Social Partnership, negotiated with the unions, also known as wel-
fare negotiated with the unions (Trampusch 2007).
(2) The lower right quadrant contains the social democratic countries, such as 
Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Norway, with high social expenditure, high expen-
diture on pensions and formalised employment. In this group, Denmark and Finland 
have a moderate percentage of their GDP invested in occupational pension plans 
and this is a supplementary support to state pensions. It is also a pension plan sys-
tem negotiated with unions. This group also includes countries with contributory 
regimes, with high expenditure on pensions and social protection, but with low 
Fig. 14.1 Pensions systems classification by countries. Source: Own elaboration
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participation in occupational and private pension plans. Austria and Germany are in 
this group. Below these appear the Mediterranean countries, such as France, Italy 
and Spain (8.8% GDP), whose main difference is the scarce participation in capi-
talisation regimes (that is, in occupational and private pension plans). It can be 
added that the growth in private pension plans and occupational pensions has been 
halted by the financial downturn since the European recession, as well as other fac-
tors that we will examine below. However, Spain, Greece, Portugal and Italy have a 
greater proportion of informal employment. Therefore, they may have been forced 
to make a greater effort to develop non-contributory and welfare pension plans.
Lastly, (3) the lower left quadrant contains the Latin American countries, such as 
Brazil, Argentina, Mexico and Uruguay, which are part of the group with high infor-
mal employment, a low capitalisation pension regime and a contributory system for 
formal employment, but with weak institutionalisation (Ubasart and Minteguiaga 
2017). This group also includes Chile, although it tends to be closer to the first 
group of liberal countries. This is a group of countries with a strong duality in the 
pension regimes: the insiders with the contributory system derived from formal 
employment and the outsiders who are not entitled to access contributory pensions, 
but possibly with certain welfare protection and non-contributory resources, which 
correspond to the Latin American model known as a regime of structural 
heterogeneity.
14.4  European Convergence in the Reform Policies 
of the Welfare State
To date this century, the reform policy of the welfare states in Europe has tended to 
adopt certain standards of harmonisation or even convergence considering they are 
facing shared problems, such as the ageing of the population, precarious labour 
markets, public debt, the financial downturn and the forecast of public expenditure 
on pensions for the decades to come, in the context of the limits imposed by the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1992, such as the control of public deficit, public debt and 
inflation, as well as the limits imposed by the Great Recession (Comisión Europea 
2003; European Commission 2012, 2020). Let us take a look at these limits.
14.4.1  Limits in Policies
As we have indicated above, governments have seen their room to manoeuvre to 
finance pensions in each of the four countries studied reduced.
Spain In the case of this country, in 2007 accumulated public debt was relatively 
moderate (35.6% of the GDP), but the Great Recession forced it to make a huge 
effort to cover the unemployment benefit and pensions, in such a way that in 2018 
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the accumulated debt represented no less than 97.6% of the GDP in 2018 (see 
Fig. 14.2). The reduction in the room to manoeuvre was also reflected in the fiscal 
deficit, the difference between fiscal income and expenditure. In 2007 Spain still 
had a surplus of 7.7% of the GDP as a result of the expansive economic cycle that 
took place between 1995 and 2007. However, the deficit shot up from 2009 (−10.4%) 
to 2012 (−10.4), which were the hardest years of the recession. Since this date it has 
reduced, but the deficit was still worrying in 2018 (−2.4% of the GDP, see Fig. 14.3). 
But the pressure is there: the forecast of expenditure on pensions tends to increase 
towards 2030, as reflected in Table 14.4.
United Kingdom This country was also very affected by the Great Recession. The 
public debt in 2007 was also moderate (41.5% of the GDP). Between 2010 and 
2013 said debt rocketed until reaching 79.5% last year, and it continued to increase 
until 2018 (86.2%). This trend is also reflected in the fiscal deficit. In 2007 it already 
had a fiscal deficit of −2.6% of the GDP. In 2009 the deficit reached −10% of the 
GDP and from that date on it reduced until reaching −1.3% of the GDP in 2018.
Argentina This country, unlike the previous two, experienced moderate growth 
during the period (see Chap. 2), in such a way that it contributed to reducing its 
public debt: in 2006 it had a debt of 70% of the GDP. It managed to gradually reduce 
it to 38% in 2011. But from this date onwards, it increased again until reaching 52% 
in 2015 and 86% in 2018. The fiscal deficit has followed a parallel trend: in 2006 it 
had a slight surplus (1.3%), and in 2008 again (0.2%). From that date onwards, it 
has grown until reaching −3.9% in 2018.
Chile This is the only country that started with a very low level of accumulated 
public debt, barely 3.8% of the GDP, with a fiscal surplus of 7.7 and 4.7% of the 
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Fig. 14.2 Public debt as % GDP. Source: Expansión (2020). Datos macro-economicos
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increase from 8% of the GDP in 2010, to 17% in 2015 and 25.5% in 2018. The fiscal 
deficit is −2.7% of the GDP. In comparative terms, this is the only country—of the 
four countries compared—that can have some room to manoeuvre to improve social 
policies.
14.4.2  Some Shared Elements in the pension reforms
In international institutions, such as the OECD (2020), certain similar partial 
reforms can be distinguished in the pensions that could lead to a supposed conver-
gence in the reforms, such as: (1) the rise in the retirement age and the minimum 
retirement age; (2) incentives to remain longer in employment, after turning 65; (3) 
restricted early retirement; (4) extension of the coverage of welfare pensions; (5) 
reduced taxes on low pensions and increase in benefits; (6) diversification of the 
possibilities of contribution and of obtaining benefits; (7) suspension of adjustments 
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Fig. 14.3 General government fiscal balance as % of GDP.  Source: OECD (2020) and 
Expansión (2020)
Table 14.4 Projection of social expenditures on pensions (% GDP)
2015–2016 2020 2025 2030
Argentina 7.8 – – –
Chile 5.1 – – –
Spain 12.2 12.3 12.4 12.6
UK 7.7 7.7 8.0 8.0
OCDE 8.8 – – –
Source: OECD (2020)
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other measures. This is a list of possible measures suggested by the OECD (2020), 
but the measures vary from one country to the next depending on the financial situ-
ation of the Social Security, the demographic evolution, the forecast of expenditure 
on pensions, the government in power, the power of unions and the institutional 
network. Therefore, we are talking about diversification, as we indicated in the ini-
tial hypothesis.
In this regard, we will show the diversity of responses between European coun-
tries such as Spain and the United Kingdom (for the case of occupational pensions), 
or between Chile and Argentina. The same welfare models (contributory- 
proportional liberal or Bismarckian) do not always seem to adopt the same criteria 
of reforms.
14.5  Characteristics and Reforms of the Pension Systems
In this section we will give an account of the reforms of the pension systems in the 
four countries treated as specific cases.
14.5.1  Pension Reforms in Spain: The Toledo Pact
In the case of Spain, the pension system has been undergoing reforms since 1995. 
The reform is known as the Toledo Pact and it has been followed by successive 
subsequent reforms, in 2005, 2006 and 2011. The negotiation of the Toledo Pact has 
failed as a result of the political deadlock (2015–2020) and the parliamentary insuf-
ficiency to implement it. Today, due to the instability in the Spanish Parliament and 
the strong discrepancies between unions and political parties, it is difficult, but not 
impossible, to renew the Toledo Pact. However, all the actors positively assess the 
Toledo Pact, from 1995 to today, because it entailed creating a long-term political 
commitment between the Right and the Left. This commitment is explained by the 
nine million pensioner voters conditioning the political vote: no political party can 
dispense with this huge electoral force. This seems to be a common problem in 
other European countries, pursuant to the ageing of the population. Another politi-
cal achievement of the Toledo Pact has been the creation of a Parliamentary Board 
(which we interpret as strong institutionalisation) and the commitment to negotiate 
said pact every 5 years.
The chief goals of the Toledo Pact in 1995 and in its successive reforms can be 
summarised as follows (De la Fuente et al. 2018):
 – To raise employees’ contribution to the Social Security to access pensions. It has 
gone from 2 to 15 years in recent decades and now the calculation of the whole 
work life is being discussed, although it is difficult to come to an agreement on 
this point as a result of the contributory shortages of many workers.
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 – The second achievement has been the fight against the underground economy 
and the persecution of fiscal fraud in order to improve the financing of retirement 
pensions, unemployment protection and Social Security.
 – The third objective was to delay the “de facto” retirement age. The legal age was 
65 until the 2011 reform. However, the average de facto retirement age is 63.3, 
since many large companies use early retirement to restructure their staff. Part of 
the early retirement is covered by unemployment benefit and part is paid by the 
company until the employee reaches 65. From that age onwards the pension is 
covered by the Social Security. The last pension reforms in 2013 sought to extend 
the formal retirement age to 67.5. This goal will be reached gradually.
The current discussion of the reform of the Toledo Pact includes, with a narrow 
margin of consensus, the following objectives; (1) Extension of the legal retirement 
age: 65–67.5 (measure already passed by the government). The person must have 
contributed for 38.5 years to obtain 100% contributory pension. The progressive 
application would culminate in 2027; (2) Encourage delayed retirement (for every 
year delayed—65 years—the future pension increases by 2%); Increase the number 
of years in the calculation basis from 35 to 37 years for maximum pension for those 
born after 1957; the minimum number of years of contribution will be 15, to receive 
50% of the pension; (3) The elimination of the Sustainability Factor (introduced in 
the 2011 reform) is being discussed, which entails an adjustment as the population 
ages, in such a way that 5% more life expectancy reduces the initial pension by 5% 
(this was to come into effect in 2019, but the socialist government froze this mea-
sure this year).
In 2011 the Assessment and Reform Report of the Toledo Pact, published by the 
Ministry of Employment, defended the need to reach a financial balance, as claimed 
by the European Union. To do so we must diversify sources of finance, increase the 
Reserve Fund, guarantee contributory pensions; prolong work life due to the ageing 
of the population and because of life expectancy; mobilise and guarantee the inte-
gration of women into the workforce; protect the most vulnerable groups: widow 
and orphan benefits; fight against fraud and the underground economy; strengthen 
the principle of “contribution”; promote complementary systems through tax allow-
ances; legally channel migratory flows to avoid social dumping.
The fourth objective, achieved in the first Toledo Pact in 1995, was the funding 
of non-contributory pensions, through general state budgets. This affected a large 
number of housewives (Martín Artiles and Molina 2015).
Fifth, flexibility in the retirement age was another seemingly important achieve-
ment of the first pact. This consisted of the possibility of a person aged over 60 
being able to partially retire with a part-time work day, and a younger person with a 
hand-over contract would take their place. But this measure has not been very suc-
cessful. Lastly, another important achievement was creating a Reserve Fund for 
pensions, provided in 2005 with 23 billion Euros, which would act as a buffer in 
periods of crisis; effectively this is how it was used during the economic recession 
from 2008 onwards, and today it has been practically fully spent.
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In February 2011 a tripartite agreement was made between the socialist govern-
ment, the Confederation of Employers and Industries of Spain and the Comisiones 
Obreras and Unión General de Trabajadores trade unions. The Social and Economic 
Agreement is still in force. In it, the parties committed to economic growth, employ-
ment and the guarantee of pensions, as well as the progressive increase of the calcu-
lation base of the contributions from the last 15 to 25 years of work life, to obtain 
100% of the pension.
Likewise, in November 2013, the Popular Party (PP) government unilaterally 
passed a basic reform that affects the revaluation of the pensions, up to then indexed 
in the Consumer Price Index (CPI), consisting of: (1) The revaluation index (from a 
minimum of 0.25% to a maximum of 0.5% of the CPI); (2) The Sustainability 
Factor, linked to demographic criteria, involves a reduction in the average pension 
as life expectancy increases. But with the change to a socialist government this 
Sustainability Factor has been frozen and the price index has been applied again 
in 2020.
Individual pension plans and occupational capitalisation pensions, both consid-
ered to be complementary pensions, have received a certain boost in recent years. 
This is precisely one of the goals of the European Union to diversify the sources of 
funding of the pensions. But these pensions have not had the success, or the impor-
tance they have in Anglo-Saxon countries. There is a considerable difference 
between Spain and the United Kingdom. The occupational pension systems have 
not been successful in Spain, France or Italy, despite it being a policy suggested by 
the European Union and its Multi-pillar Welfare State project. The Negotiated 
Occupational Welfare State does not fit well with countries with many small com-
panies, due to the weakness of the representation of unions and employers, the 
weakness of the collective negotiation and the scarce participation of workers in 
production profits. For this reason, in Spain there are limited negotiated pension 
plans in large companies, while the centralised and generally effective collective 
negotiation system (erga omnes) covers all workers (80%) with the force of the law 
(Martín Artiles et al. 2016).
14.5.2  Trends in the United Kingdom
The majority of current debates about the pension system in the United Kingdom 
are conceived in the context of the growing concern for the ageing of the population 
and the financial sustainability of pensions, on the one hand, and the political 
responses which since the 1970s have been inspired by the neoliberal ideology that 
questions the cost of the ageing of the population and the role of the State in provid-
ing pensions, on the other (Foster 2017; Grady 2016; Naczyk 2018). The Office for 
National Statistics (ONS 2015) estimates that the population aged above 65 in Great 
Britain will grow twice as quickly as the population of working age, representing 
almost one quarter of the population by 2037, with the consequent changes in the 
proportion of contributors to the pension system compared to beneficiaries of the 
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system. This represents a fundamental challenge for the future sustainability of pen-
sions in the United Kingdom (Hofäcker 2015).
Pensions in the United Kingdom are a complex and mixed system. They can be 
classified into three groups: (1) state pensions, which can be the “basic state pen-
sion” and “second state pension” (S2P); (2) private occupational pensions, which 
can be “defined benefit pensions” and “defined contribution pensions”; and (3) indi-
vidual/personal private pensions, which can be pensions of interested parties (stake-
holders’ pensions), and self-invested personal pensions.
This section will focus on the first two pension groups due to their greater rela-
tive importance within the system. We will begin with state pensions. The modern 
basic state pension, known as the “Old Age Pension”, was introduced in Great 
Britain in 1909 under the Old-Age Pensions Act 1908 and it was aimed at prevent-
ing poverty in people’s old age. It was the first step towards establishing a Social 
Security system with unemployment benefit and healthcare, introduced through the 
National Insurance Act in 1911, which was established with the creation of the 
British Welfare State in the period following the Second World War. State pensions 
are financed through contributions to the National Insurance, related to income, and 
participation in the system is compulsory.
There is agreement that the most important change that took place in state pen-
sions since the 2007–2008 financial downturn is the implementation of the new 
single tier state pension. From 2016 to 2017 onwards, the basic state pension and 
the second state pension were replaced by a new single tier state pension for all 
those people below retirement age. The Department for Work and Pensions of the 
United Kingdom introduced this change in a rather euphemistic manner: “The cre-
ation of the single tier pension will essentially reform the state pension system. It is 
designed in the light of a modern society, with a clearly defined function: to provide 
the bases to support people who are saving for their retirement” (DWP 2013: 27). 
In short, the proposed system eliminates the second state pension that had offered a 
top-up, related to income, on the basic state pension based on the nominal social 
security (Berry 2016). The main difference that exists between the previous ver-
sions of the system and the new proposed system is that it will not be essentially 
universal, with a greater possibility of authorising unpaid activities than was possi-
ble in the past.
However, from a more critical perspective, Berry (2016) rightly points out that 
by redefining the purpose of the state pension as a means for individuals to save for 
retirement, the reform is a subtle way of reducing social welfare via which the State 
withdraws from any attempt to provide a true income-replacing benefit for pension-
ers, instead of providing a context in which individuals can become self-sufficient 
and silently contribute more to the system. According to the opinion of some aca-
demics, this is another expression of the “financialisation” process of the social 
welfare benefit in the United Kingdom, which started in the 1970s and has intensi-
fied since the financial downturn and the implementation of austerity programmes 
(Berry 2016; Langley 2008). In the case of pensions, financialisation refers to the 
notion of policy according to which “individuals [not the State] must assume the 
personal responsibility of their own long-term financial security” (Berry 2016: 1). 
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As we will see, financialisation is also a characteristic observed in the (private) 
occupational pension system and it is the rationality that explains the greatest 
change that has taken place in this system with the introduction of “automatic 
registration”.
In the United Kingdom, occupational pension plans are agreements established 
by employers of all sizes to provide pensions (and other benefits related with the 
workplace) to their employees. These were created by virtue of the Pension Schemes 
Act 1993, the Pensions Act 1995 and the Pensions Act 2008. Occupational pension 
plans are financed through a combination of contributions from employers and 
employees. Therefore, although employers and workers contribute, they are essen-
tially capitalisation plans. Employers’ contributions generally represent a greater 
proportion of total labour costs than employees’ contributions. These pensions are 
financed through contributions of at least 8% of the employees’ gross salaries, with 
at least 4% paid by the employee, 3% by the employer and 1% by the State through 
a reimbursement in national security contributions. Due to the decentralised nature 
of collective negotiation in the United Kingdom, the large majority of occupational 
pension plans are offered at company level (Naczyk 2018: 85–86).
‘Occupational welfare’ has a longstanding history in the United Kingdom dating 
back to the nineteenth century with the establishment of charity associations that 
granted rights to benefits for illness, accidents and deaths, as well as old age and 
unemployment benefits, but which, nevertheless, excluded the lowest strata of the 
labour force (Harris 2004). Occupational pensions are prior to statutory pensions. 
Until the 1970s, occupational pension plans, which were quite ‘generous’ and were 
barely regulated by the state, essentially favoured qualified workers who employers, 
through their contributions to the system, wanted to retain; with “early leavers” 
(workers who were going to be dismissed) effectively subsidising the pensions of 
the end salary of permanent ‘white-collar’ workers (Naczyk 2018: 84).
Occupational pensions started to change dramatically with the establishment of 
individual/personal pensions in 1988 (the third pension group in the initial classifi-
cation) by Margaret Thatcher’s government, following the enactment of the Social 
Security Act in 1986. According to Pierson (1994), these laws afforded workers the 
possibility of changing their occupational pension or second state pension and sign-
ing a new pension plan (actually a personal investment plan) with other private 
service providers, such as insurance companies, banks and building societies and 
unit trusts.
In 2015, there were more than 6000 professional regimes in the United Kingdom, 
of which 5000 were in deficit. The employers tended to offer their employees access 
to an occupational pension plan with defined benefits, generally based on the end 
salary, in other words, usually the employee was promised a pension of a fixed pro-
portion of his/her salary calculated at the time of retirement. With the increase in the 
longevity of the population and the drop in interest rates, this scheme gradually 
became unsustainable, and many employers started to exclude new employees from 
the scheme of defined benefits as well as those who were offered pensions of defined 
contributions. Under this agreement, the employer (and sometimes the employee) 
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makes regular payments to a private pension fund, and the fund is used to buy a pen-
sion when the employee retires (DWP 2010).
The most important change that has occurred with the occupational pension 
plans since the financial downturn is the introduction of the “self-registration” sys-
tem in 2018. The Pensions Act of 2008 stipulates that, from 2018 onwards (depend-
ing on the size of the company), all employers will be entitled to automatically 
self-register their workers in occupational pension plans, thereby transferring more 
responsibility to employers to guarantee that their employees are registered in the 
business plan. Those workers who do not want to be registered will have to ‘opt out’ 
of their employer’s occupational pension plan, instead of ‘opting in’ as was the case 
in the past.
The gradual introduction of the new system sought to eliminate the inequalities 
in accessing the system, for example, between occupational categories, company 
size and sectors of activity. The chief inequality is the gap existing between public 
sector employees, among whom membership of the system reached 87% in 2014, 
and private sector employees, with only 49% the same year (Naczyk 2018; ONS 
2015). In 2014 the average membership in the United Kingdom was 59%. The key 
question from the perspective of this chapter is that the new ‘self-registration’ sys-
tem introduced to expand the occupational pensions, guarantees that the majority of 
people employed save into a ‘private’ pension plan, in addition to the state benefit 
to which the person is entitled (Berry 2016). This analysis is consistent with the 
hypothesis of the financialisation (Watson 2009) of the pension system presented 
above, in which individuals, not the State, assume greater responsibility for their 
own financial security; this can also be observed in other areas of British social policy.
14.5.3  Characteristics of the Reforms in Chile
In order to present the specific characteristics of the reforms and re-reforms of the 
social welfare systems in Argentina and Chile from 2008 to date, it is important to 
note that both countries were categorised as belonging to the group of pioneering 
countries with Uruguay and Costa Rica, since their welfare systems compared to 
other countries on the continent were established between the second and third 
decade of the twentieth century, between 1919 and 1930 (Mesa-Lago 2000).6
Considering the historical evolution of the Chilean welfare system, Arenas de 
Mesa (2010) defines a first stage between 1924 and 1950 based on five pension 
funds which grouped together in the first three the majority of dependent workers, 
and in the two remaining funds, the Armed Forces and the police. For the 1950s, the 
pension system was characterised by the coexistence of a multiplicity of regimes 
6 Specialists qualified the Latin American countries in three groups: pioneering-high, intermediate 
and late-low. In general, the conditions of access to pensions were liberal especially in the pioneer-
ing-high group. This author points out that “said systems suffered stratification, high costs, an 
increasing deficit, financial and actuarial imbalance” (Mesa-Lago 2004: 13 & 19).
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(150) and by institutional atomisation (35 funds). In the second stage, starting in the 
1970s, the system sought to converge with the standardisation guidelines formu-
lated in the Beveridge Plan. For this decade, Chile had one of the most advanced 
systems: it covered all the contingencies, it presented high coverage and afforded 
generous benefits. However, to characterise the system of this period we use the 
metaphor of Mesa-Lago who referred to this as a bureaucratic labyrinth, legally 
complex and stratified, which was incubating considerable inequalities and suffered 
financial and actuarial imbalances.
The third stage refers to the reform leading to replacing the distribution system 
with a capitalisation system during Pinochet’s dictatorship in 1981 (Decree Law 
3500 and 3501). In Chile the welfare reform replaced the distribution system of 
defined benefits with a compulsory individual capitalisation system, of defined con-
tributions, paid for by the workers into a personal retirement account and managed 
by private anonymous associations: the Pension Fund Managing Companies (AFP).7
One of the characteristics of this system is that not only is any idea of social soli-
darity—the fundamental principle governing distribution systems—lost, but, in the 
capitalisation system of individual accounts, the AFP become managers of the accu-
mulated funds. Some authors highlight that the essential characteristic of this new 
system is that the contribution is only made by the worker, freeing the private com-
pany of any contribution. In 2002 a reform was introduced which allowed five pen-
sion fund options to invest through individual accounts; under this option the 
member could choose the type of investment and level of risk in which their funds 
could be used. The introduction of multi-funds meant pension managers became 
important actors in local and financial markets. According to Mesa-Lago (2009) the 
impact of the intervention of these AFP in the Chilean economy meant that 28 years 
would pass, in democracy, before establishing the reform of the welfare system 
in 2008.
In addition to the problems highlighted by the ILO, such as the lack of solidarity 
and coverage, gender inequality and the lack of representation of insured parties, 
countless diagnoses have reflected the increasing inequality that said pension sys-
tem introduced into Chile; among those most mentioned there are not only the 
changes of parameters of the contributory conditions to retire, but the use of a life 
expectancy table differentiated according to sex is indicated, as well as the use of a 
complex calculation methodology which lays the foundations of unequal treatment 
for women (Yáñez 2010). In general, there is a serious coverage problem for those 
developing independent activities, leaving more than half of retired people in condi-
tions of vulnerability and poverty.
The re-reform of the welfare system introduced during Bachelet’s government in 
2008, can be summarised in the return of the role of the State as guarantor of a 
7 The establishment of the retirement system freed the employer from making contributions to the 
employee’s individual account. Furthermore, the roles of the market and the State in the manage-
ment of pension systems also changed, assigning the former their financial management, and the 
latter their regulation and supervision, as well as the focused and welfare relief of old age poverty 
(Uthoff 2008).
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certain conception of universal rights and the creation of the Solidarity Pension 
System (SPS) which, via a new public institutionality, would implement measures 
to increase the welfare coverage of vulnerable groups such as youths, women8 and 
independent workers. Following the international indications during Bachelet’s 
government, a commission was created for the analysis of the welfare reforms rep-
resenting wide social sectors seeking the legitimacy of same.
Although the reform persists in sustaining the individual capitalisation system of 
the former Pinochet regime, a series of changes are introduced which mean not only 
the reduction of costs, but also achieving better pensions for members, as well as 
strengthening the Voluntary Welfare Savings (APV). The conditions to access basic 
solidarity pensions (PBS) and the Solidarity Welfare Contribution (APS) include 
requirements such as being part of the 60% of the population with lower incomes 
and having spent a minimum period of 20 years in the country including four out of 
the past 5 years, and having turned 65 both for men and women.9 The reform has led 
to a new institutionality that establishes the Pension Reserve Fund (FRP), with an 
initial contribution of 60.45 million dollars at the end of 2006.
Regarding said reform, some analysts highlight its benefits since for some it is an 
“integral system” that reconciles the contributory dimension with the non- 
contributory dimension and consolidates the role of the State, while gender and age 
inequalities are adjusted for young people (Arenas de Mesa 2010). For other ana-
lysts, the system follows an unbalanced logic because this new “solidarity” state 
pillar is too similar to social welfare and jeopardises the celebration of the re-reform 
(Birgin and Pautassi 2001). Or from a much more dissatisfied perspective, such as 
that of Soto Pimentekl (2015), the reform perpetuates a neoliberal retirement model 
that operates according to the principles of equivalence, focalisation and centrality 
of the market, with SCI and the capital market being the distribution mechanisms, 
through their free operation via their own rules.
In any case, some authors highlight the introduction of the non-contributory ele-
ment of financing with fiscal resources, under the objective of guaranteeing the 
welfare protection of all those people excluded from the private contributory system 
(Yáñez 2010: 20).
8 The subsidy for saving for old age in two groups at greater risk as regards their pension savings 
funds: women and young people. The law establishes a subsidy for working women, through the 
“child allowance”, and for young people, through the “youth employment subsidy”. In both cases, 
a sum of money is placed in the pension savings account (Soto Pimentekl 2015).
9 The APS is a supplementary payment in addition to self-financed pensions from the private sys-
tem. It is granted to all pensioners who receive pensions lower than a minimum sum established 
from 1 September 2009 at 150,000 Chilean pesos. This sum gradually increased until 2012 when 
it reached 255,000 Chilean pesos per month, the equivalent to approximately 150 dollars per 
month at an exchange rate of 500 Chilean pesos per dollar (Yáñez 2010: 21).
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14.5.4  The Welfare System in Argentina
The Argentinian welfare system evolved from the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury to 1946 through pension funds for each sector with a similar result to Chile in 
terms of its fragmentation, the unequal conditions of access, and sums of contribu-
tions and benefits (Panigo and Médici 2013). In the mid-1940s the system extended 
to all workers until 1969 when it was unified and began to be governed by the 
National Social Welfare System (SNPS).
In the mid-1980s, diagnoses weighted a range of factors referring to the financial 
sustainability problems of the SNPS; among these, analysts pointed out the drop in 
real salaries in inflationary conditions and the subsequent increase in unemploy-
ment after the collapse of the occupation structure towards informality; with a 
growing expansion in the services sector and in self-employment; the growing 
degree of informality added to the old problem collection bodies had to oversee the 
activities of self-employed people or independent professionals (Lo Vuolo 2008). 
The diagnoses also weighted the weight of the aging of the population, the direct 
impact of which affected the support rate (active/passive relation) and the exhaus-
tion of the welfare surplus, considering its use for financing state functions other 
than social welfare. All of these variables made it impossible to meet the legal 
defined benefit parameter of the pension credit equivalent to 82% of the salary of a 
worker in activity in a similar position (Bonari et al. 2009).
In a context of complicated legislative and union negotiations, in 1994 two 
changes occurred. One was an important change regarding the age parameters to 
access the pension and another one regarding the necessary years of contribution. 
The retirement age increased from 55 to 60 for women and from 60 to 65 for men. 
Furthermore, the requirement to contribute more years to the system increased from 
20 to 30 years of contribution. In addition, Law 24.241 introduced the option to 
retire in one of the two pension systems, distribution or capitalisation. On the one 
hand, a tripartite public distribution system, managed by ANSeS (National Social 
Security Administration) and, on the other hand, an individual capitalisation regime, 
managed by Retirement and Pension Fund companies, known as AFJP. The coexis-
tence of both systems, distribution and capitalisation, led to a mixed social wel-
fare system.
In this way, the State guaranteed a minimum contributory pension perceived as 
the Universal Basic Benefit (PBU) via which similar defined benefits were granted 
to all insured parties, according to age and years of contribution. Furthermore, via 
private capitalisation, an additional pension was paid. Both contributory options 
operated in addition to a non-contributory pension system. But the mixed system 
imploded with the severe financial downturn in 2001, and despite adjustments and 
partial modification since 2003, the system was reformed again in 2008.
Following the severe socio-political and economic crisis in 2001, a social redis-
tribution was promoted, implementing non-contributory social protection policies. 
The aim was to universalise pensions for elderly adults who have not contributed the 
sufficient number of years to the distribution system. In this regard, it is important 
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to note the way in which the idea of work informality has no longer been problema-
tized as a voluntary choice of workers but as a problem in the application of macro-
economic policies. That is why it is considered a reparatory measure, as it compares 
formal workers with informal workers (Hopp and Lijterman 2019).
The welfare re-reform of 2008 (Law 26.425) entailed the end of the mixed sys-
tem implemented in 1992, withdrawing the private capitalisation system, and 
returning to the state distribution system. From January 2009, all members were 
transferred to the public distribution system SIPA (Argentinian Integrated Welfare 
System) managed by ANSeS with the transfer of funds from individual AFJP 
accounts to the Sustainability Guarantee Fund. Known as the Welfare Inclusion 
Plan or Programme, the strategy to extend the welfare coverage through early 
retirement programmes or moratoria helped to rectify and increase the number of 
beneficiaries. The Welfare Moratorium granted a pension to all adults of retirement 
age in December 2004, who did not have the required 30  years of contribution, 
through the implementation of a monthly discount of the missing contributions. A 
second strategy, complementary to the previous one, was the offering of early retire-
ment which enabled those who were less than 5  years from retirement or were 
unemployed (but had contributed to the system, although the years of contribution 
were not complete), to receive 50% of the pension.
14.5.5  Comparative Summary
Summarising the compared models, we observe that:
The first substantial difference between Europe and Latin America lies in the 
degree of institutionalisation of the pension systems. In Europe, the institutionalisa-
tion is strong, it is linked to rights and duties, to citizens’ rights and with the con-
tributory control of employment in social security, there are fiscal sanction regimes. 
In America, on the contrary, the high volume of informal employment undermines 
the social protection institutions (Table 14.5).
 1. Contributory pensions in Spain are the main protection system for pensioners, 
but they have financial sustainability problems because new jobs have low sala-
ries and because of the high number of temporary contracts. There are also polit-
ical difficulties to renew the Toledo Pact agreements. One of the chief problems 
lies in the low salaries in new jobs—created during the European recession and 
afterwards—for young people. One of the paradoxes is that the average pension 
paid is above the average salary of the new jobs, which is a serious problem for 
the future. For example, in 2017 the average gross salary was lower (1271.88 
Euros) than the new average retirement pension (1318.47 Euros), which threat-
ens the sustainability of the pension system: a true intergenerational solidarity 
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crisis.10 This is a similar problem in Argentina. Currently, new salaries are lower 
than retirement pensions. In other words, new salaries are not sufficient to sup-
port the fiscal pressure entailed by pensions, which threatens to render the pen-
sion system unsustainable or to seek new financing options, such as the idea of 
the Multi-pillar State. However, these changes arise again in the Argentinian 
debate, especially with the commitments made due to debt with the IMF which 
advises labour, fiscal and pension reforms.
10 The response to this problem has recently, in January 2020, been a rise in the minimum inter-
professional salary by decree of the socialist (Podemos) government.
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 2. The net replacement rate11 of public and private pensions is one of the reforms 
that threatens the purchasing power of pensioners. The replacement rate accord-
ing to the contributions paid to public and private regimes is proportionally high 
in Argentina (83.7%) and in Spain (72.3%), that is, in the regimes where the 
Bismarckian contributory-proportional system dominates. On the contrary, it is 
very low in the United Kingdom (43.5%) and in Chile (36.2%), where private 
capitalisation pensions dominate.
 3. The retirement age is being extended in Spain; with the last reform it began a 
progressive increase from 65 years to 67.5 in 2027. In the United Kingdom it has 
gone from 65 to 68 to be reached in 2034. In Argentina it has not changed since 
1994. In Chile the retirement age is 65. This may be an important matter in the 
years to come as a result of the increase in life expectancy and the fostering of 
“active aging” policies.
 4. Another problem is the gender inequality among pensions, which can be 
explained by the composition effect of the job and the discontinuous trajectories 
in women’s careers, a problem shared in all the countries. In the same way, gen-
der inequalities related to pensions are debated in both continents.
 5. Occupational capitalisation pensions are important in those countries with a neo-
liberal political tradition, such as the United Kingdom and Chile, typical models 
of the financialisation ideology. In these two countries the occupational and pri-
vate pension funds have financial sustainability problems, both due to their frag-
mentation and due to the low yield of the capitalisation funds in a long context 
of low types of financial interest. In the case of Chile, there is a social movement 
to return to the public pension funds guaranteed by the State. In the case of 
Spain, occupational pensions have not been successful, despite being included in 
the Toledo Pact in 1995 and in the consecutive years. The financial downturn has 
halted its growth since 2007, due to the reduction in profitability of the financial 
capital. Therefore, there is no convergence between Spain and the United 
Kingdom. The well-known convergence in some fora is only rhetorical as a 
political discourse (OECD 2020). The reality is that in Spain the State covers the 
deficits through special taxes. Moreover, the trend towards capitalisation systems 
encounters an obstacle in the growth of informal employment in the countries in 
Latin America. As was discussed in Chap. 2, the informal sector has been grow-
ing considerably for decades, partly due to work flexibilisation, typical of the 
neoliberal policies applied in the region.
 6. Individual private pensions are equally important in liberal countries such as the 
United Kingdom and Chile, ideal type models of financialisation capitalism; this 
is not the case in Spain and Argentina.
 7. Negotiated Welfare, according to Trampusch (2007) is only important in the 
United Kingdom and somewhat in Chile. This model is inspired by the principle 
of the individual right of the insured party, rather than on the ownership of the 
social rights of citizens. In Spain, the inclusion of pensions in the collective 
11 “The net replacement rate is defined as the individual net pension entitlement divided by net pre-
retirement earnings, taking account of personal income taxes and social security contributions paid 
by workers and pensioners.” See, http://oe.cd/pag. (OECD 2020).
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negotiation is only registered in large companies; occasionally, pension plans are 
registered for small socially insured companies. But an important difference 
compared to other countries is the social agreement (pick level) reached with the 
Toledo Pact. The Toledo Pact has a profound political meaning in terms of legiti-
misation of the Bismarckian contributory-proportional model, based on inter- 
classist vertical solidarity. In addition, the social pact props up social order, 
demonstrating the importance of unions.
 8. Lastly, informal employment presents an access problem for workers to their 
future pensions. In the United Kingdom informal employment is not of great 
importance. In Spain it is relatively moderate and the solution is the providing of 
a minimum pension. The majority of those who receive it are women. In Chile 
and Argentina informal employment is a serious barrier that hinders access to 
capitalisation pensions. A response to the problem of informality, of precarious-
ness in employment and of the working poor is the growth of neo-welfarism. 
Neo-welfarism appears to be a generalised trend in the four countries to help 
severe poverty, which is often in addition to voluntary assistance, religious insti-
tutions and NGOs; hence the growth of the third sector.
14.6  Conclusions
As regards the general hypothesis, we have shown that the United Kingdom and 
Spain share reforms inspired by the idea of the Multi-pillar state, which promotes 
occupational welfare via capitalisation. However, the evidence shows us that actu-
ally the two countries are very distant from each other. In the United Kingdom 
occupational welfare via capitalisation is very important, while in Spain it is rela-
tively insignificant. But it is part of the political discourse on the sustainability of 
the welfare state, although a rhetorical discourse, despite being included in the 
Toledo Pacts. In a certain way, as pointed out by Adelantado and Calderón (2005), 
we are facing the same (rhetorical) response to similar problems, but in our opinion 
the results are different. In practice, in Spain, unions defend the traditional 
contributory- proportional public system, which continues to be important as an 
inter-classist means of solidarity, although questioned by the crisis of inter- territorial 
solidarity. The political right has seen how the sustainability of the welfare state is 
an important market of votes in the elections. Neoliberal policies have been applied 
more in the labour market (flexibilisation) than in the welfare state.
Argentina and Spain share a contributory-proportional pension system, also 
inspired by the corporate model, with the participation of unions and employers 
which defend the well-known Bismarckian model. Although in the Argentinian case 
it is burdened by the high volume of informal employment and the low institution-
alisation of the pension systems, which hinder inter-classist solidarity due to the 
strong dualisation of its labour market (insiders, with formal work/outsiders with 
informal work). In Chile, the pension system via capitalisation is very fragmented, 
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representing a much more unequal and neoliberal system, which highlights an indi-
vidualised model with low solidarity. But today this is highly contested by a social 
and union movement that defends solidarity through the role of the state.
14.6.1  Final Discussion
The analysis of the four countries shows that in a certain way there are similar dis-
courses (spill over effect), but with different contexts and policies according to the 
society and institutional context, the government, the power of unions, social move-
ments, but also the demographic context. As a consequence, the reforms have not 
been uniform. But there are underlying ideological trends which drive the reforms 
towards a multi-pillar model. These trends, as we will explain below, are: (1) the 
organic solidarity crisis; (2) the inter-classist solidarity crisis; (3) the inter- 
generational solidarity crisis and (4) the inter-territorial solidarity crisis. We could 
state that the trends of the reforms are conditioned by these four solidarity crises.
First, we can discuss the “organic solidarity” crisis, which appears in the recon-
struction of the former “mechanic solidarity”, such as mutual support, inter-family 
help and voluntary help. This is giving rise to the development of territorial solidar-
ity policies and the growth of the third sector, which has been called “second wel-
fare” by some authors (Pavolini et al. 2013).
Second, we can visualise the inter-classist vertical solidarity that has led to the 
rejection of fiscal pressure and to claims to reduce taxes, which has been driven 
particularly by liberal, conservative and even social democratic parties. In response 
to this, individualist values and meritocracy have increased; those with higher 
incomes reject the rise in taxes. A reflection of this is the trend towards the transfor-
mation of language, in such a way that we have gone from “citizens’ rights to the 
rights of the insured party” (Antón 2009).
Third, inter-territorial solidarity also went into crisis after the 2007–2008 finan-
cial downturn. The growth in nationalism and regionalism in many European coun-
tries has caused a rejection of the transfer of resources between rich and poor 
regions, between countries from the north, greater contributors to the coffers of the 
European Union, and those from the south of Europe.
Lastly, another element is the inter-generational solidarity crisis. Salary devalu-
ation during and after the Great European Recession has affected the salary incomes 
of young people, and the quality of their employment. An example of this is the 
“working poor”: workers who are poor despite having work, have increased 
in Europe.
In short, after presenting the characteristics of the systems in Chile and Argentina 
and observing the trends towards occupational pensions in Spain and the United 
Kingdom we believe that it is essential that whatever welfare reform is implemented, 
this must be publicly and widely discussed, seeking maximum consensus through 
commissions that adequately represent the sectors involved. Publicity of the debate 
is important for citizens’ education, as well as to legitimise the reforms, so that 
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different future governments do not undermine that which has previously been 
achieved (Mesa-Lago 2004: 100).
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